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Dobson: Fred M. Frohock, Abortion: A Case Study in Law and Morals

BOOK REVIEWS
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A MYOPIC VIEW
TRACY DOBSON*

ABORTION: A CASE STUDY IN LAW AND MORALS, by Fred M. Frohock

In the highly acclaimed Japanese film "Rashomon" four people
are in various ways involved in a rape and murder. The film vividly
depicts their starkly different perceptions and understandings of these
events. Frohock finds an analogy between the abortion controversy
and this film because it so forcefully illustrates that reality is based
more in individual perceptions than commonly believed. Like the
characters in "Rashomon," abortion activists hold widely differing
views of the same action, namely, the termination of pregnancy
through induced abortion.
Frohock attacks his subject from a variety of perspectives. He
begins by announcing the several themes he subsequently develops
and by hinting at the solution he proposes in the final chapter. He
reviews methods commonly relied upon to settle disputes and finds
them all lacking as responses to the difficulties presented by this case.
Morality is an insufficient guide because the positions of both sides
rest upon fundamental and deeply held moral beliefs, respect for
human life in the case of pro-life, and the affected woman's freedom
of choice in the case of pro-choice. These principles are in irreconcilable conflict. An additional substantial obstacle to resolution of the
dispute through a morals-based consensus rests in differing beliefs
about the status of the embryo. The pro-life partisans maintain that
human life begins at conception while many of the pro-choice proponents believe that it begins later.
Another obvious avenue needing exploration is the law. Frohock
presents a detailed analysis of relevant past and present law which
captures the most important of the numerous legal issues involved.
Developing a number of legal sub-themes, he focuses on Roe v. Wade
and the right to privacy. He points out that even though the court
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disclaimed the choice of one moral principle over another, such a choice
is implicit in the court's creation of the "viability principle." Moreover,
since the decision in that case has not served to settle the issue, but,
rather, has further inflamed pio-life passions, he identifies a number
of alternative resolutions to the controversy that might have proved
less unsettling. Furthermore, the author recognizes that due to changing technology, viability comes earlier and earlier in pregnancy,
presumably shrinking the area of discretionary authority of the pregnant woman.
Frohock concludes that a resort to law is a poor way to resolve
this dispute and points to its failure thus far as shown by the refusal
of pro-life forces to acquiesce in the Roe decision. He chronicles successful post-Roe political attacks on the right to abortion, such as the
Hyde amendment, and returns to the idea of the failure of "common
justifications" in declaring that justice and fairness concepts are not
helpful in resolving this conflict. In addition, because of the asymmetry of power between the born and the unborn and two conflicting
philosophies, one based on an "individuated" society and the other
on an "organic" society, he argues that the best hope of achieving
settlement is through a "constructed consensus."
Frohock proposes the adoption of a middle position which the
mainstream of both sides might find tolerable and by which the present powder keg atmosphere might be defused. He argues that a policy
which allows only first trimester abortions and refuses public funding
for them (in the absence of individual taxpayer consent through use
of a "check-off' system) would express enough of each position to make
it politically acceptable. According to Frohock, since abortion
opponents are members of a political society which cannot long suffer this extreme polarity, they should recognize that a political compromise of this nature is the most promising avenue for arriving at
a truce between "two moral agents."
I found both strong and weak points in the book's style and
analysis. In presenting his ideas, Frohock shows stylistic strength and
gives them more force by inserting quotations from interviews of
abortion controversy activists. It makes the book more lively and, at
the same time, gives additional credibility to the author's summary
of their positions. Use of quotations also makes palpable the high level
of emotion and the great depth of feeling involved in what might otherwise seem a one-dimensional and dry analysis.
The basic outline of the facts and ideas presented is logical. In
addition, through the use of interview quotations and minute dissection of opposing viewpoints, including their implications and ramificahttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/9
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tions, Frohock skillfully brings into fine resolution the intractibility
of the issue. If one ever doubted the depth of the moral conflict,
reading this book will make it self-evident. The author accurately concludes that the law is ill-equipped to solve this problem in a satisfactory manner. There is no consensus on the issue; there is no right
or wrong answer; and, like alcohol consumption during Prohibition,
it won't go away.
Considering the substance of the ideas offered, the book presents
a wide variety of relevant concepts, although those well-versed in the
controversy will find little that is new. Frohock identifies and discusses
philosophical inconsistencies of the abortion controversy opponents.
Pro-choice people are often "liberals" who, in their desire to achieve
social justice, favor state intervention. In this particular instance,
however, they believe the state ought to have no role, that individual
privacy and discretion should prevail. While that view has some
legitimacy, I am not persuaded that it is inconsistent to insist on protection for civil liberties and, at the same time, to believe it is society's
duty to help those who cannot help themselves. The means are not
the same, but there is consistency in the ends sought to be achieved.
On the other side of the controversy, pro-life advocates are
generally "conservatives," who in most circumstances are staunch
believers in liberty and individual responsibility. Yet it is these "conservatives," Frohock observes, who insist that the state should play
a decisive role in individual abortion decisions by taking away choice
and ensuring that a pregnant woman carries her pregnancy to term.
As Frohock recognizes, however, there is difficulty in generalizing
about "liberals" and "conservatives" and on which side of this issue
they fall. Despite my less than full agreement with it, I found this
part of the analysis thought-provoking.
Frohock identifies a major related problem which neither side
has sufficiently addressed in rhetoric or in action. According to
statistics presented in the book, approximately three-quarters of
pregnancies ending in abortion are unwanted or unplanned. A-decrease
in unwanted pregnancies should dramatically reduce the need for and,
consequently, the number of abortions performed. Frohock is right on
target when he says pro-life forces unrealistically insist on chastity
for unmarried teenagers and no sex education outside of the home
when it is well-known that teenagers are becoming sexually active
at younger and younger ages and that most parents do not discuss
sexual matters with their children. Pro-choice advocates acknowledge
a high level of youthful sexual activity but focus almost exclusively
on technical birth control information without addressing the moral
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and emotional issues involved. The provision of purely technical information has apparently reached an insufficient number of the sexually active or too few have been persuaded to use it. Significant progress on this front could make abortion a non-issue due to reductions
in numbers of abortions obtained.
Despite its strong points, in my judgment this book has a number
of glaring shortcomings both in style and substance. Stylistically,
Frohock could have made his points in a much more succinct and clear
manner. He frequently rambles from idea to idea, and, even though
the issues he develops and discusses are inherently overlapping, there
is needless repetition from chapter to chapter of the same concepts.
Furthermore, at times he goes into painstaking detail to build to a
relatively minor point, while at other times major assertions pop up
without development or support.
The book's substantive inadequacies are more problematic.
Frohock's proposal to resolve the conflict seems weak and unlikely
to end the debate. The existing denial of public funding as a result
of the Hyde Amendment and individual state actions has angered
pro-choice forces, and yet has failed to bring about a significant reduction in abortions (according to Frohock's statistics). This is clearly the
goal of pro-life advocates. Thus, their drive to deny the right to abortion remains unabated. Moreover, I disagree with Frohock and see
no logical or even emotional basis for distinguishing, on a governmental
funding level, abortion funding from so many other hotly debated
government expenditures, such as the vast sums spent to support the
Vietnam War. In other words, cutting funding here may establish
an undesirable and unworkable precedent where any controversial
expenditure could become subject to taxpayer "check-off."
Similarly, it is overly optimistic to believe that pro-life forces
would accept first trimester abortions or that pro-choice proponents
would accept loss of individual control after the first trimester. A
rule requiring that a woman who does not discover her pregnancy
until after ninety days must under all circumstances carry it to term
would surely be unacceptable to pro-choice adherents. A tremendous
rise in the number of illegal abortions would occur and would result
in serious complications or death for the women involved. In addition, if such a rule were in place, it is likely that many potential early
second trimester abortions would be obtained sooner, to beat the
deadline, further thwarting the pro-life objective.
Toward the end of the book, Frohock admits that any solution
may be only temporary in nature due to technological "advances"
which continue to move viability to ever earlier developmental stages.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/9
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This is an inherent weakness of his thesis. In other words, once the
eight-week embryo is "viable," even moderate pro-life advocates will
find the notion of first trimester abortions unacceptable, and Frohock's
compromise will fall apart.
What is more likely to happen and more "viable" as a practical
solution is only touched on in the book: technological advances obviating the need, in most cases, for abortion. A relatively troublefree "morning-after-pill," while perhaps still repugnant to pro-life
forces, will give women complete discretion on the question of whether
to carry to term. Such a drug will be virtually impossible to regulate,
practically or politically, according to Representative Henry Hyde,
author of the amendment which prohibits the use of federal funds
for abortions.
Frohock ignores two crucial aspects of the abortion debate. First,
he fails to focus on the very religious nature of the dispute. In many
respects it is a religious conflict. This is yet another reason why prochoice proponents are unlikely to accept any restriictions on the right
to choose. They are not willing to have the religious beliefs of others
imposed on them.
Within the Christian belief system is the notion that human life
begins at conception and ends at earthly death. While many may
ascribe to this view, many pro-choice people do not believe human
life begins at conception (Frohock states this many times) or believe
that existing life, that of the pregnant woman, has a superior right
(a point not emphasized by Frohock). Furthermore, there are those
who have a more fluid view of human life, who do not see it beginning and ending within these narrow confines, and, on that basis, are
not troubled morally by abortion. Human energy denied one outlet
will find another.
The most serious flaw of this book is the failure of the author
to address an issue seen as the essential partner to and co-equal of
abortion in the view of pro-choice proponents. Frohock discusses the
great tragedy of the pregnant teenager/child as if for most other
women, especially those who are married, unwanted pregnancy is
merely a minor inconvenience requiring only the slightest rearrangement of plans. This may have been unintentional on his part, but I
think it is fair to say that most readers will be struck by this
misconception. I think it is also fair to say that "inconvenience" greatly
understates the ramifications and implications of an unwanted pregnancy. It is not merely inconvenient to be pregnant for nine months
and, with great pain, give birth. It is not merely inconvenient for a
person to give up for adoption a part of herself. In the same vein,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
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it is not merely inconvenient to drop out of the work force, or abandon a career for several months or years for which one has worked
long and hard and, in any case, it is not merely inconvenient to maintain an 18 or 20 year continuing and daily emotional and financial
commitment to a child. The missing issue is about women's ability
to fully participate in economic and political affairs.
The abortion controversy involves not only embryos and fetuses
but the position of women in society, and the right, or lack thereof,
to make very fundamental choices about how one's life will be lived.
To pro-life adherents, biology is destiny. To pro-choice adherents,
reproductive freedom is the essential key to the opportunity for full
and equal participation. Such a central issue must be explored in a
work which seeks to fully capture, discuss, and propose a settlement
of the abortion debate.
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AN ENGLISH JUDGE AND HIS SCOTTISH CRITICS
ALFRED W.

MEYER*

Edited by Peter
Robson & Paul Watchman. England: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd.,
1981. Pp. xvi, 253. $18.
JUSTICE, LORD DENNING AND THE CONSTITUTION.

Hero worship begets debunking of both the hero and the worshippers. Nowhere is this more true than in the community of scholars,
a most inhospitable environment for adulation of any kind. So it is
that Lord Denning, a heroic figure in the history of English
jurisprudence (ironically, a self-described iconoclast'), takes his lumps
at the pens of eight Scottish2 academics in this collection of essays.
They have set for themselves a formidable task. For over thirty years,
Lord Denning has occupied center stage as a jurist whose opinions
and extra-judicial writings have heavily influenced the politics of his
country. And, as a departed countryman of his might have observed:
therein lies the rub. Judges should be neither popular nor political.
When they are both, the capacity for evil boggles the mind. Believing that the antidote is exposure, the essayists seek to provide an
"alternative view"-alternative, that is "to the uncritical admiration for the judiciary in general, and Lord Denning in particular"3
Who is this judge and what has he done to warrant this critical
attack? At the risk of boring, if not offending, the Anglophiles among
us, a resume is provided. Denning was born in 1899; educated at
Magdalen College, Oxford (Firsts in Mathematics and Jurisprudence);
named Prize Student, Inns of Court; appointed Judge of the High
Court of Justice, 1944; appointed Lord Justice of Appeal, 1948-1957;
appointed Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, 1957-1962; and appointed Master
of the Rolls, 1962, his present position.4 The titles are impressive and

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Denning, The Way of an Iconoclast, 5 J. Soc' PUB. TCHRS L. 77 (1959).
2. They may not all be Scots but with one or two exceptions they are listed
as affiliated with Scottish universities. JUSTICE, LORD DENNING AND THE CONSTITUTIN
v (P. Robinson & P. Watchman eds. 1981.) [hereinafter cited as LORD DENNING].
3.
Id. at xiii.
4. The chronology of the titles would suggest a demotion from the House
of Lords to the lesser position of Master of the Rolls. But this is only relatively so
since the Master of the Rolls g1resides over and controls the civil litigation in the
Court of Appeal which is in many respects a more important appeal court than the
House of Lords. For Lord Denning, the "activist," the choice was clearly to "step down"
and head the court which has the last word on most of the cases of great urgency.
*
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so are the accolades bestowed on him in and out of the legal profession: "[t]he contemporary scene in Great Britain is unthinkable without
Lord Denning...,,5 "[tlhe post war era [is] the period of legal aid, law
reform, and Lord Denning"8 ; "[y]oung lawyers for several decades have
given him their hero worship as a Mr. Valiant-for-Justice"; "[a] St.
George of the law courts" His publications include over 200 judicial
opinions, twenty-six articles and lectures published in professional journals, and two books which made The Sunday Times best sellers lists.'
The influence of his judicial opinions on the development of the law
has been pervasive. According to the introductory essay, he has
stamped his imprimatur on
[t]he creation and development of the concept of promissory
estoppel, the attempt to introduce a jus quaesitum tertio
into English law, the proposal of a just and equitable approach to frustration of contract, the campaigns against exemption clauses and penalty clauses, the rapid extension
of the boundaries of tortious liability, the limitation of
Crown privilege, the increased accountability of local
authorities for their officials, the greater willingness of the
judiciary to scrutinise administrative actions by the application of natural justice principles and the way of judicial
review, and the rebellion against the principle of stare
decisis....."
The essayists are primarily attempting to indict Denning's
method of judicial decision making, not his results. However, lest we
consider their emphasis on method trivial, they label the accused a
"poser of a real threat to the rule of law"'" whose methodology is
"dangerous and unconstitutional."12 The essayists further charge that
"his approach is teleological. He thinks of the result before he considers the legal reasoning .. " And "[hie dispenses justice on the basis
of pragmatism rather than principle."13 The essayists are not content

Whether a demotion or not, he did not lose the title. Apparently, once a lord (like
judges), always a lord. He will, however, be referred to as Denning throughout this
review.
5. LORD DENNING. supra note 2, at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at vii.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 37.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
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to rest their case on broad brush rhetoric or on an analysis of Denning's opinions in celebrated or landmark cases. They recognize that
to do so would make them guilty of that which they criticize. They
therefore painstakingly examine the Denning record across the judicial
board including such arcane areas as the delineation of tenant's rights,
the interpretation of testamentary deeds, and the frustration of
contract.
One cannot do justice to the essays by summarizing or paraphrasing their content. They are exceedingly detailed and well-crafted.
Perhaps their criticism can be best exemplified by illuminating the
role played by Denning in a single episode-his "creation" of a shortlived contract doctrine called "fundamental breach."
Fundamental breach was a doctrine whose time came in the 'fifties and went in the 'sixties. Prior to its development, the cases and
literature on both sides of the Atlantic bristled with attempts to deal
with the problem of disclaimers or "contracting-out." Maine had observed that the movement of progressive societies was "from status
to contract." He was not around to see the continuation of the movement from status to contract and back again to status. With the power
of the pen (and printing press) the merchants' draftsmen imposed a
serf-like status on consumer buyers by disclaiming responsibilities and
excluding remedies.
The American case law of disclaimers divided into 1) those courts
which expressed sympathy for the victims and invited the legislature
to do something and 2) those courts which utilized what Llewellen
called the "covert" or "back-door" techniques of "interpreting" the
clauses to avoid their intended meanings. 5 Denning would have neither.
Living up to his "St. George" reputation, he confronted the dragon
with a weapon forged from an ancient and honorable line of precedents
in the law of bailments and carriers. Denning christened the new doctrine in a case of a car that "would not go." The car had been sold
under a contract containing the clause: "No condition or warranty that
the vehicle is road worthy, or as to its age, condition or fitness for
any purpose is given by the owner or implied herein."'6 Reversing
the trial court's judgment for the seller, Denning held that "a breach

14. The issue reminds one of the perhaps apocryphal account of the dialogue
between Hand and Holmes as the latter departed to assume his seat on the United
States Supreme Court. Hand's parting admonition: "Do justice, Sir." Holmes' terse
response: "Mine is not to do justice, but to apply the law."
15. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 705 (1939).
16. Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis, 119561 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A.) at 937-38.
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which goes to the root of the contract disentitles the party from relying on the exempting clause."17
Although some of his critics would have us believe otherwise,
he was not content to rest the result solely on his own authority.
From the law of sea carriers (and later bailments), he drew an analogy
based on the concept of "deviation." When goods were lost while a
carrier was "deviating" from the route (or when goods were lost or
damaged when stored by a warehouseman in an unauthorized place),
a clause limiting liability would not apply even though the loss was
not caused by the deviation. The deviation "ousted" the contract, and
with it, the clause limiting liability. When draftsmen sought to avoid
this result by "authorizing" the deviation, the House of Lords rejected
the attempts as being "inconsistent with what one assumes to be the
main purpose of the contract. 18
It was but a short step for Denning to connect the present to
the past and find that the "main purpose" of a contract was a "core"
and that a breach which went to the "core" (or "root") disentitled
a party from relying on limitation or exclusion clauses. The doctrine
was short-lived, as the House of Lords repudiated it in 1967.19 In a
later case, Lord Witherforce dryly observed: "there are ample
resources in the normal rules of contract law for dealing with these
[clauses] without the superimposition of a judicially invented rule of
law."2 Thus the doctrine was consigned to history to be revived only
as an example of Denning's alleged arrogant usurpation of legislative
power.
The fundamental breach episode is a microcosm of the theme
which pervades the entire collection of essays. The title, Justice, Lord
Denning and the Constitution, does not warn the reader of its sarcasm. The authors' thesis in these essays is that Lord Denning has
sought "justice" at the expense of rules of law-that his judicial
method is unconstitutional. They argue that it would be bad enough
if the evil were confined to his judicial opinions. But he also writes
17. Id. at 940-41.
18. Glynn v. Margetson & Co., [1893] A.C. 351 at 357. Denning does not deserve
all the credit (or blame) for the historical underpinnings of the fundamental breach
doctrine. Lord Devlin (then Devlin J.) had foreshadowed its formulation in several cases
a few years earlier in Alexander v. Railway Executive, [1951] 2 K.B. 882 and Smeaton
Hanscomb & Co. v. Sasson I. Setty, Son & Co., [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468 (Q.B.). Denning's
role was to make the dicta law. The story is told at some length in Meyer, Contracts
of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1189-98
(1964).
19. Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche
Kolen Centrale [19671 A.C. 361.
20. Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] 1 All Eng. Rep.
556, 561.
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books about the law "without departing from the judicial manner, [or]
the style in which the contentious and controversial are presented
as if beyond contradiction."2 The authors might pardon judges if they
sometimes speak with an authority greater than their own when they
decide cases. After all, they are merely applying the law. But when
writing books judges become mere mortals. The author of the concluding essay makes sure that neither our eyes nor our ears can miss
the point:
That is to say, he colludes when he is on the Bench. In
his books, Law is invoked then occluded. Lord Denning the
virtuoso justifies professionally his performance by
reference to an orchestra and, somewhere, a score. From
time to time we are permitted to hear the other players,
but mostly in the books if our maestro is not blowing his
trumpet and banging his drum he is humming the other
parts so loudly that we can never have the opportunity of
judging them for ourselves. The over-exuberance for which
he is frequently criticized in the Court of Appeal is
translated into egocentricity in the texts (citations omitted).22
Were he in competition with American activist judges, Denning would be bringing up the rear. To be cavalier in our midst is
to disregard doctrine, precedent, and the legislature. The American
activist judge tells it like it is; which, according to some, is the same
as telling it like it ought to be. But in a country which legal realism
forgot, Denning's innovative use of doctrine, history, and precedent
makes him a suspect target. On the American scene, Cardozo
manifested many of the Denning characteristics: a passionate concern
for justice, an abiding respect for precedent, a craftsman's approach
to the writing of an opinion, and an advocate's zeal in "selling" the
justness of his result. When the tension between precedent and his
sense of justice became too great, Cardozo was not above manipulating
the doctrine to fit the cause. 23
One suspects that Lord Denning has enjoyed reading these
essays more than did the authors in writing them. Disingenuous?,
maybe; Dangerous?, hardly; Wounded?, yes. But when you strike at
a king, you must kill him. This the authors have not done. Like the
hero inthe melodrama, Lord Denning survives-a bit bloody, perhaps,
but unbowed.
21.
22.
23.
he went to

LORD DENNING. supra note 2, at 212.
Id. at 213.
See, e.g., DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917) (where
great pains to uphold but distinguish a precedent embarrassing to his result).
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